Archive for the ‘Economy’ Category

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The euro ‘family’ has shown it is capable of real cruelty‘ – Suzanne Moore

Angela Merkel and Jean-Claude Juncker seek to justify their Greek bailout deal, but what kind of family asset-strips one of its members in broad daylight?
The seemingly indestructible Angela Merkel can go without sleep, and still manage a half smile and speak about Greece’s wish to remain in “the euro family”. This may sound reasonable and pleasant. All families have their little local difficulties, don’t they? But they work through them. People see reason. When they are forced to.

By infantilising Greece, Germany resembles a child who closes its own eyes and thinks we can not see it. We can. The world is watching what is being done to Greece in the name of euro stability.

It sees a nation stripped of its dignity, its sovereignty, its future.

What kind of family, we might ask, does this to one of its own members? Even Der Spiegel online described the conditions that have been outlined as “a catalogue of cruelties”, but perhaps we should now put it another way, given Jean-Claude Juncker has denied that the Greek people have been humiliated. Juncker instead says that this deal is a typical “European” compromise. Yes, we see.

The machinations of financial institutions (the troika) have been exposed as much as the institutions themselves. Who runs these banks, and for whom? Twitter slogans talk of the three world wars: the first waged with guns, the second with tanks and this third world war waged by banks. Extreme? Well, there clearly is more than one way to take over a country.

The Eurozone and Germany want regime change in Greece, or at least to split Syriza. Alexis Tsipras has fought tooth and nail for something resembling the debt restructuring that even the International Monetary Fund acknowledges is needed. The incompetence of a succession of Greek governments and tax evasion within Greece is not in doubt. But the creditors of the euro family knew this as they upped their loans, and must now delude themselves that everything they have done has been for the best. It hasn’t, and now that same family will go in and asset-strip in broad daylight a country that can no longer afford basic medicines. In three days Greece is supposed to push through heaps of legislation on privatisation, tax and pensions so it can be even poorer.

There is to be no debt forgiveness in this family. Tsipras has to sell this to his people so the banks can reopen. His endurance has been remarkable, and more will be needed. The unsustainability of Greek debt, even if the country could achieve growth, remains. The words trust and confidence keep being used but by the wrong people. Trust is gone in this European project. François Hollande, ever the pseudo–mediator, may rattle on about the history and culture of Greece. Its value has actually been shown. Its value is purely symbolic. It is worth nothing.

The euro family has been exposed as a loan-sharking conglomerate that cares nothing for democracy. This family is abusive. This “bailout”, which will be sold as being a cruel-to-be-kind deal is nothing of the sort. It is simply being cruel to be cruel.

~ Suzzane Moore
guardian.com

Please note
By mistake, this article by Suzzane Moore (from the Guardian) was published at this blog as a page in 2015. We are now publishing it as a post as it was meant to be. Thank you.
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Greece: Out of the Mouth of “Foreign Affairs” Comes the Truth

By Bruno Adrie

In an article by Mark Blyth titled “A Pain in the Athens: Why Greece Isn’t to Blame for the Crisis” and published on July 7th 2015 in the magazine Foreign Affairs, one discovers surprising statements, which are all the more surprising when one knows that this magazine is published by the Council on Foreign Relations that gathers the American élite, the New-Yorker banking élite being there for the most part (about this subject, see: Laurence H. Shoup and William Minter, Imperial Braintrust: The Council on Foreign Relations and United States Foreign Policy, 1977).
According to the author, “Greece has very little to do with the crisis that bears its name”. And, to make us understand this, he invites us to “follow the money—and those who bank it”. According to him, the origins of the crisis are not to be looked for in Greece but “in the architecture of European banking”. Indeed, during the first decade of the euro, European banks, attracted by easy money, granted massive loans in what the author calls “the European periphery”, and, in 2010, in the middle of the financial crisis, banks had accumulated impaired periphery assets corresponding to 465 billion euros for French banks and 493 billion euros for German banks. “Only a small part of those impaired assets were Greek”, but the problem is that, in 2010, Greece published a revised budget equivalent to 15% of the GDP. Nothing to be afraid of actually since it only represented 0.3% of the Eurozone’s GDPs put together. But, because of their periphery assets and above all a leverage rate* twice as high—that is to say twice as risky—as the American banks’, European banks feared that a Greek default would make them collapse. This is what really happened. The banks’ insatiable voracity led them, as always, to act carelessly, and, as they did not accept their failure, as always, they made sure that others would foot the bill. Nothing new under the golden sky of the Banking Industry, unless, this time, it went a bit further than usual.
These banks set up the Troïka program in order to “stop the bond market bank run”. And no matter if it increased unemployment by 25% and destroyed the third of the country’s GDP. It doesn’t make much difference to the bankers. This is what the rescue plans have been used for. Apparently aimed at Greece, they were created by and for the major European banks. Today, given that the Greek can no longer pay French and German banks, even the European taxpayers are solicited.
Greece was only a pipe through which French and German banks, for the most part, saved themselves. On the total amount of 203 billion euros that represents the two rescue plans (2010-2013 and 2012-2014), 65% went right to the banks’ vaults. Some people even go so far as to say that 90% of the loans did not pass through Greece. This approach, expressed in the columns of Foreign Affairs, cannot be seen as heterodox. It is even confirmed by the ex-director of theBundesbank, Karl Otto Pöhl, who acknowledged that the rescue plan was meant to save the banks, and especially the French banks, from their rotten debts.
Therefore, despite the fact that Germany defaulted on his debts four times in the XXth century, he will go on insisting that Greece pay, with France supporting him. However little some people like it, like the ignorant and wordy French philosopher whose décolletage every one knows but whom no one wishes to hear anymore, François Hollande hasn’t been generous to Greece. It is quite the contrary that happened, it is Greece that has been generous, and forced to be, to the French banks, before these very banks call on French taxpayers, when they were celebrating their revolution, their heads full of a firework of prejudices.
Mark Blyth finishes his article by saying what Frédéric Lordon developed in his article (in French) “Le crépuscule d’une époque”, namely that the European Central Bank does not play the role of a central bank and does not act like a politically independent bank.
According to him, we never understood Greece because we refused to see this crisis as what it is actually: the continuation of the private banks rescue plan that started in 2008.
One wonders how the French, who are so clever and so ready to give their opinions since they know everything about everything, can go on supporting the insane vociferations of the know-it-all from this little Parisian journalistic world, which is described by the excellent Pierre Rimbert in his article (in French) “Syriza delenda est” in the Monde Diplomatique, July 2015. Rather than burying Greece, we’d better off get rid of the proud and twisted faces of Demorand, Elkabbach, Giesbert, Baverez, Barbier, Aphatie, and others, by sending them carp in the desert in the middle of traitorous scorpions and venomous snakes which are their respectable and mute brothers.
~ Bruno Adrie (translated by Clara Piraud)
~ see from Mark Blyth and Matthias Matthijs, The Future of the Euro, Oxford University Press, 2015
http://www.globalresearch.ca

Ένα πολύ ενδιαφέρον άρθρο για την ελληνική οικονομική περίπτωση και πώς το βλεέπει ο τύπος του εξωτερικού.
Το άρθρο υποστηρίζει ότι τη μεγαλύτερη ευθύνη για το τωρινό οικονομικό πρόβλημα της Ελλάδας φέρουν οι Γερμανικές και Γαλλικές Τράπεζες που εκμεταλλεύτηκαν την ευκαιρία κατά τη διάρκεια της πρώτης δεκαετίας του ΕΥΡΩ εγκρίνοντας τεράστια ποσά ΕΥΡΩ σαν δάνεια στις χώρες της περιφέρειας (The European Periphery), με άλλα λόγια στις χώρες Ελλάδα, Ιταλία, Πορτογαλία, Ισπανία. Από τις επενδύσεις τους αυτές ένα πολύ μικρό ποσό ήρθε στην Ελλάδα. Αλλα οι Γαλλικές και Γερμανικές τράπεζες αποκόμισαν απ’ αυτά τα δάνεια κέρδη 465 και 493 δισεκατομμυρίων ΕΥΡΩ αντίστοιχα.
Όταν παρουσιάστηκε η κρίση του 2010, που απλώθηκε στην Ευρώπη από την Αμερική, οι τράπεζες αυτές σε κίνδυνο να χρεωκοπήσουν κι αφού η ισολογιστική τους κατάσταση ήταν πραγματικά δραματική, αντί να καταφύγουν στους Γάλλους και Γερμανούς πολίτες-φορολογούμενους και καταθέτες που θα πλήρωναν τα σπασμένα, μετέφεραν τις χασούρες στους πληθυσμούς των χωρών της Νότιας Ευρώπης (λογιστικό τέχνασμα της κεντρικής τραπεζιτικής πολιτικής της Ενωμένης Ευρώπης) στις χώρες της περιφέρειας, Πορτογαλία, Ιταλία, Ελλάδα, Ισπανία (PIGS).
Αυτές οι απόψεις γράφτηκαν στις στήλες του περιοδικό Foreign Affairs και υποστηρίχτηκαν από τον πρώην διευθυντή της Γερμανικής Κεντρικής Τράπεζας (Bundesbank) Karl Otto Pohl.

Για να μη λένε τουλάχιστον ότι όλα τα κακά ξεκίνησαν απ’ την Ελλάδα.

Η ανωτέρω περιληπτική μετάφραση του άρθρου από τα αγγλικά στα ελληνικά έγινε από το Μανώλη Αλυγιζάκη
http://www.authormanolis.wordpress.com

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Bryan Gould: Greece may now be forced to leave the EU

2:10 PM Friday Jul 10, 2015

Like so many others, I long ago got used to being pilloried as “anti-European”.
My crime was daring to say that the “Europe” we were urged to sign up to was no such thing, but was a particular arrangement cooked up by the powerful and foisted on the people of that often benighted continent without bothering either to consult them or to take count of their wishes.
As the Greek crisis unfolds, and as it strips bare the pretensions of those powerful forces who talk with less and less conviction of the European ideal and of democratic rights, we can surely no longer be in any doubt.
The “Europe” in whose service so much sacrifice is now demanded is a cartel of bankers, financiers and right-wing politicians who have no interest in democracy, or jobs, or the living standards of ordinary people.
As the Greek people suffer, and plead “no more”, it is not the travails of the Greeks – or, for that matter, the Spanish, or the Portuguese, or the Italians – that weigh with Europe’s powerful; their sights are fixed on maintaining austerity and discipline, on adhering to ideology and doctrine.
Above all, they are determined to protect the euro, because it is the one weapon that ensures that there can be no backsliding. The euro was put in place so that, whatever temptations – or even imperatives – there may be, there can be no going back. The grim and unrelenting disciplines of neo-classical economics demand nothing less.
For many of us, this imposition of a single monetary policy and discipline on a hugely diverse European economy was always destined to fail. There was no way that small and underdeveloped economies like Greece could survive competition from a powerful German economy, especially when it was the Germans who had the power to decide on the monetary policy that should be put in place – and no prizes for guessing whose interests that policy turned out to serve.
The irony is that is those powerful interests – represented by the IMF, the European Central Bank, and the European Commission and obliged to follow the dictates of the German Finance Minister – who now find that, despite the disparity in power between them and a bankrupt and demoralised Greece, it is they – and not the supposedly feckless Greeks – who have the responsibility for saving the euro.
With the power of the referendum result behind him, Prime Minister Tsipras can now say that there is nothing more he can do. Ravaged by austerity, Greece has no resources left. Unless they are helped by a bail-out package that does not drive them deeper into collapse but instead gives them a chance, over time, to begin to grow again, they will be forced – since there is no other option – to leave the euro and seek their own salvation.
The Greeks have, in other words, taken their decision. There is nothing left for them to decide. The ball is now in the court of Europe’s leaders. It is nor fort them to give up entrenched positions. It is up to them to decide whether to refuse to help, with the result that Greece will have to leave the euro whether they like it or not, simply to survive, or to relent and offer a more acceptable and realistic package that will keep Greece afloat and allow them to stay in a re-shaped common currency.
We know what they want to do. They have stuck to the current stance in the hope that the Greek government will fall and “regime change” will be brought about. There has even been talk of a government imposed on the Greek people from outside or of a government of “technocrats” that will do the bidding of the financial establishment. The referendum result, though, seems to have put paid, for the time being at least, to that disgraceful objective.
But, for a brief period, the Greek crisis has given us a glimpse of the mailed fist and doctrinaire rigidity behind the “European” ideal. Rarely can there have been such a stark demonstration of the inherently undemocratic nature of the European power structure and of the interests it truly serves.
It may be that the Greeks, by forcing an “agonizing re-appraisal”, will end up having done the true adherents of a united Europe a favor. It may be that, at long last, we will begin to contemplate a Europe based on agreement freely given by the continent’s governments and peoples, an agreement to build a Europe by learning from each other how to work together and to cooperate more closely, a functional Europe that will do those things that are best done together rather than separately, a “bottom-up” Europe that will develop as a result of, but not getting ahead of, a growing sense of European identity and the wishes of its peoples.
We need a Europe, in other words, that is not just a vehicle for advancing powerful interests, and riding roughshod over everyone else, but that understands that the Greek poor and unemployed are just as important, and just as essential, to Europe’s future, and that enabling them and millions like them to live a better life is both a united Europe’s true purpose and its only real chance of success.

~ Bryan Gould is a former UK Labour MP and former vice-chancellor of Waikato University.

~WWW.NZHERALD.CO.NZ

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What Will Happen to Greece If It Leaves the Euro?

By Jordan Weissmann

With this weekend’s big “no” vote in its bailout referendum, Greece has edged ever closer to finally leaving the eurozone. Its government is heading to Brussels today for last-ditch negotiations with European leaders over a new rescue package. But with a deal far from sure and time ticking away, a Grexit is starting to feel “more likely than not,” as JPMorgan put it.
And what would happen then? If only we knew. Breaking up with the euro would almost certainly involve some nasty short-term suffering for Greece. But economists disagree about whether the pain might one day be worth the payoff. In one camp you have Nobel Prize winners Paul Krugman and Joseph Stiglitz, among others, who think that finally bidding goodbye to the common currency might actually be the country’s best hope for reviving its depressed economy. In another, you have pessimists like the 246 economics professors from Greek universities who recently warned that doing so would lead to “disastrous economic, social, political and geopolitical consequences.”
Since we lack an oracle to reveal what the future holds, I’ve outlined possible best- and worst-case scenarios for Greece in the event of a Grexit. But first, you might be wondering …
What if Greece doesn’t want to abandon the euro?
It might not have a choice. Greece can’t technically be expelled from the eurozone. But it may have to bow out “voluntarily” if the European Central Bank cuts off the emergency loans that are now keeping the Greek banking system from collapsing. Were that to happen, Athens would need to start printing money in order to bail out its financial sector. Since Greece can’t legally print euros, it would have to print new drachmas instead.
And we may well be approaching that endgame as Europe loses patience with Greece’s left-wing government. After refusing to raise its current €89 billion ceiling on emergency lending over the weekend, the ECB took steps Monday that could theoretically make it more difficult for Greek banks to borrow, presumably to put more heat on Greece’s negotiators. Should Athens default on a payment due to its European creditors later this month, it’s plausible the central bank will close off the tap for good. It’s also possible Greek banks will simply run out of cash in the coming days if the ECB just stands by and refuses to increase its cap on loans.
If Greece leaves, what’s the best-case scenario?
Some argue that finally ditching the euro would be a blessing in disguise. The thinking goes like this: European policymaking—from its tight-fisted central banking philosophy to its demands for austerity—has acted like a vice crushing the Greek economy, and at this point, any deal that would keep the country in the euro would only prolong the misery. Leaving would be difficult, but liberating. Greece would default on its European debts and introduce a new currency. The new drachma would depreciate quickly, giving the economy a shot of adrenaline by helping Greek businesses sell more exports—who doesn’t love good cheap olive oil?—while luring more tourists to Santorini for affordable beach vacations. Yes, Greeks would see their bank accounts largely wiped out as their euro savings were converted into less valuable drachmas. And yes, prices of imported food, which Greeks rely on heavily, would rise. But there might be light at the end of the tunnel. As long as it’s part of the euro, on the other hand, Greece’s future is just a pitch-black slog with 25 percent unemployment.
“It’s becoming hard to see any path that doesn’t lead to Grexit,” Krugman wrote recently. “It is also, although this is still something few want to accept, becoming increasingly obvious that Grexit is Greece’s best hope. Otherwise, where is recovery ever supposed to come from?”
Grexit enthusiasts, particularly Mark Weisbrot of the Center for Economic and Policy Research, often suggest that Greece could follow in the footsteps of Argentina, the poster child for surviving and even thriving after a massive default. In many ways, it’s a seemingly tidy historical comparison. Much as Greece today finds itself stuck deep in debt with a depressed economy and a currency it can’t control, during the 1990s Argentina tied its currency’s value to the dollar, and later fell into a painful recession that forced it to accept a bailout from the International Monetary Fund in order to keep paying its creditors. But in 2001 and early 2002, the country changed course, defaulting on its loans and breaking the dollar peg, letting the peso fall in value.
The immediate aftermath was miserable—the economy crashed hard, leaving more than half the country’s urban population in poverty. Food prices skyrocketed. Imported medications became scarce. There were street protests and riots. But while the upheaval was violent, it was also relatively brief. Aided by its cheaper currency, Argentina’s economy recovered by 2005, which allowed the country to sit down with lenders and restructure its debts. From there it posted years of strong growth.
“It is worth noting that the social consequences of Argentina’s recovery were enormous,” Weisbrot wrote in 2012. “Even though the economy had a brief downturn during the world recession in 2009, employment in Argentina is at record levels. Poverty and extreme poverty have been reduced by two-thirds, and social spending has nearly tripled in real terms, since the default.”
Could Greece pull off a similar feat? Maybe so.
All that sounds pretty good. But what’s the worst-case scenario?
Imagine all the riots, drug shortages, and widespread destitution, but without Argentina’s happy ending.
Bleak, right?
As James Stewart outlined at the New York Times, there are a number of reasons to think that a Greek euro exit wouldn’t work out quite so well as Argentina’s adventure with default. Perhaps most important of all: Argentina is a major agricultural power that was lucky enough to start its recovery just as a massive commodities boom, fueled by China’s insatiable appetite, was taking off. Argentina exported a lot of soy and corn, which had the twin benefits of boosting growth directly while bringing much-needed foreign exchange into the country at a time when it was difficult for Argentina to access international capital markets.
Greece, in contrast, is not a major exporter and may not be poised to become one, especially if it’s forced out of the European Union and its trade pacts. Worse yet, as Stewart notes, its most important exports by far are refined petroleum products such as gasoline and diesel, which require imported crude to produce. Since oil is priced in dollars on the international market, a falling drachma wouldn’t make Greek refiners much more competitive or profitable.
Meanwhile, it’s no sure thing that a cheap currency will help much with tourism, especially if there are mass protests mobbing the streets due to a financial crisis. Tear gas has a way of scaring off vacationers.
Weisbrot argues that economists and journalists have overestimated the contribution that the worldwide commodity boom made to Argentina’s recovery. The real reason the country began to grow so quickly after its crises, he believes, is that defaulting on its IMF debt and letting its currency float at market rates allowed the country to abandon austerity policies that were weighing it down, much as Greece is being suffocated today. But his theory has some notable critics, including Yanis Varoufakis, Greece’s just-resigned firebrand finance minister, who called the idea that his country could “pull off an Argentina” “profoundly wrong.”
Greece would have plenty of other issues to worry about aside from exports. Joseph Gagnon of the Peterson Institute for International Economics notes that Greek corporations and banks will still owe debts denominated in euros, which will become harder to pay as the drachma devalues, possibly leading to bankruptcies. Meanwhile, if the government decides to reverse the spending cuts it’s made in recent years and run a deficit, it will likely have to finance it by printing money, which could lead to severe inflation. This is to say nothing of the more mundane but significant technical challenges of introducing a whole new currency, which is more complicated than simply breaking a peg. As University of California–Berkeley economist Barry Eichengreen wrote years ago while speculating about a potential breakup of the euro, “Computers will have to be reprogrammed. Vending machines will have to be modified. Payment machines will have to be serviced to prevent motorists from being trapped in subterranean parking garages.”
Then, of course, there’s the question of Greece’s debts to Europe, which won’t necessarily disappear, even if the government stops paying them back. Economists Carmen Reinhart, of Harvard University’s Kennedy School, told me that could make it difficult for Greece to find new buyers for its debt in the future. She and Christoph Trebesch, of the University of Munich, have found that in the wake of sovereign defaults, countries tend to start growing fairly quickly and regain their credit ratings—but typically only once they’ve restructured their old loans and resolved whether and how much they will repay their lenders.
“I don’t want to be like a wet rag, but I think the prospects of growth without resolution of the debt situation are very limited with and without a euro,” Reinhart told me. “You’re not going to have potential new creditors lining up to make new loans to Greece when the rules of the game are just not known.”
So if all goes wrong, Greece could end up with a plunging currency, frightening inflation, little to no engine driving its economy, a spate of corporate bankruptcies, and no access to credit. Its predicament now is dark. But is it worth risking that kind of economic affliction to break from Europe’s yoke? I honestly don’t know. Then again, it might not have any option but to find out.

~ Jordan Weissmann is Slate’s senior business and economics correspondent.

Από factorx στις 16/12/2011

Πως το “κούρεμα” μπορεί να σώσει την Ελλάδα

Μία από τις εμμονές μας εδώ στο antinews, από την αρχή της επικοινωνιακής διαχείρισης της κρίσης, ήταν το θέμα του δικαίου που πρέπει να καλύπτει το δανεισμό της χώρας μας, ιδιαίτερα σε μία τόσο κρίσιμη περίοδο όπου η επιστροφή σε εθνικό ή άλλο νόμισμα είναι σχεδόν βεβαιότητα, αν δεν αλλάξει κάτι δομικό στον τρόπο σκέψης της κ. Μέρκελ και στη Γερμανική θεώρηση περί ευρωπαϊκής ένωσης.

Ο λόγος που επιμείναμε τόσο, για όσους δεν έτυχε να διαβάσουν κάποιες παλαιότερες δημοσιεύσεις, είναι ότι η επιλογή νομικού καθεστώτος είναι στρατηγικής συμμαχίας με προεκτάσεις σε θέματα δημόσιας περιουσίας και εθνικής κυριαρχίας.

Αν επιλεγεί το Αγγλικό δίκαιο και παράλληλα η Ελλάδα αναγκαστεί να καταφύγει σε ένα ασθενέστερο του ευρώ νόμισμα, οι συνέπειες θα είναι καταστροφικές για πολλές γενιές, ενώ κατά πάσα πιθανότητα όλη η δημόσια περιουσία θα κατασχεθεί σε βάθος χρόνου από τους πιστωτές. Και αυτό γιατί η Ελλάδα θα πρέπει να αποπληρώσει το δυσβάσταχτο χρέος μαζί με τους τόκους, σε ισχυρό ευρώ, ενώ οι πηγές εσόδων της θα είναι σε υποτιμημένο νόμισμα. Αν πάλι γίνει το θαύμα και η Ελλάδα παραμείνει στο ευρώ, το Αγγλικό δίκαιο σημαίνει ότι δεν θα μπορέσει να υπάρξει νέα αναδιάρθρωση με νομικά μέσα, παρά μόνο άτακτη χρεοκοπία, πράγμα που θα σήμαινε αυτόματα κατασχέσεις δημόσιας περιουσίας.

Αν επιλεγεί το ελληνικό δίκαιο, η Ελλάδα έχει να επιλέξει ανάμεσα σε δύο ριζοσπαστικές λύσεις, εφόσον βέβαια εξαναγκαστεί να εγκαταλείψει την ευρωζώνη:
• Να κουρέψει μεγαλειωδώς το χρέος της με μια απλή νομοθετική ρύθμιση, διατηρώντας την περιουσία του κράτους σε ασυλία και να αποπληρώσει το υπόλοιπο χρησιμοποιώντας τα συναλλαγματικά της αποθέματα
• Να αποπληρώσει κανονικά το χρέος τυπώνοντας νόμισμα, εφόσον κρίνει ότι μπορεί να διαχειριστεί τις πληθωριστικές επιπτώσεις.
Στην περίπτωση παραμονής στο ευρώ με ελληνικό δίκαιο στο δανεισμό της χώρας, το δάνειο αυτό θα μπορούσε να αναδιαρθρωθεί οποιαδήποτε στιγμή, χωρίς κίνδυνο απώλειας περιουσιακών στοιχείων.
Οι λύσεις αυτές μοιάζουν ως προς τις ουσιαστικές επιπτώσεις τους. Το πλεονέκτημα της δεύτερης λύσης είναι η αποφυγή πιστωτικού γεγονότος, πράγμα που επιτρέπει στο κράτος να δανείζεται απρόσκοπτα, είτε εσωτερικά (σε εθνικό νόμισμα), είτε εξωτερικά, σε ευρώ, δολάριο, γιεν κ.λπ.

Η πιο επίσημη διαβεβαίωση για την εμμονή του antinews, ήρθε ανέλπιστα από έναν ‘’εχθρό’’, τον κ. Άκερμαν, CEO της Deutsche Bank και πρόεδρο του IIF (αυτό είναι κάτι σαν την τοκογλυφική διεθνή), οργανισμού που χειρίζεται τις διαπραγματεύσεις του PSI για λογαριασμό των ιδιωτών ομολογιούχων (διαβάστε εδώ).
Ο κ. Άκερμαν, ούτε λίγο ούτε πολύ, δήλωσε ότι οι διαπραγματεύσεις έχουν κολλήσει στο θέμα του δικαίου. Καθώς οι τράπεζες θεωρώντας βέβαιο ένα πιστωτικό γεγονός ή μια ηρωική έξοδο της Ελλάδας από το ευρώ ή και τα δύο μαζί, επιθυμούν να είναι απόλυτα εξασφαλισμένες, ιδιαίτερα στο αγαπημένο τους κομμάτι, δηλαδή στην κατάσχεση περιουσιακών στοιχείων.

Δεν γνωρίζουμε με ποιο καθεστώς έχουν δοθεί τα 110δις από το μηχανισμό στήριξης, αυτό είναι κάτι που μπορεί να μας διευκρινίσει ο κ. Παπακωνσταντίνου. Φρονούμε ότι δεν τόλμησε να κάνει κάτι τόσο χυδαίο εις βάρος της πατρίδας του και ότι το δάνειο, για τις δόσεις του οποίου ματώνει κάθε φορά ο Έλληνας εργαζόμενος, διέπεται από το ελληνικό δίκαιο. Συνεπώς ακόμα και σήμερα υπάρχει πεδίο διαπραγμάτευσης, πράγμα που αποτυπώνεται και στην πικραμένη μουτσούνα του αρχιτοκογλύφου, με τον πιο γλαφυρό τρόπο.
Όσο η κατάσταση αυτή βαδίζει προς ένα τέλμα, αρχίζουν να φανερώνονται και τα βαριά χαρτιά της κάθε πλευράς. Διαβάζοντας πίσω από τις γραμμές μπορούμε με βεβαιότητα μα πούμε ότι τα ελληνικά χαρτιά είναι πανίσχυρα. Η χώρα μας έκανε μια αξιοζήλευτη επίπονη προσπάθεια να παραμείνει στη ζώνη του ευρώ και δέχθηκε αδιαμαρτύρητα να γίνει το πειραματόζωο των χαρτογιακάδων όλης της υφηλίου.

Τώρα που τα πράγματα ζορίζουν και που η ίδια η ευρωπαϊκή ένωση πνέει τα λοίσθια, κανείς δεν μπορεί να κατηγορήσει την Ελλάδα για απομονωτισμό ή αφερεγγυότητα. Τα ψέματα τελειώνουν και πλησιάζει η ώρα των μεγάλων αποφάσεων για την Ευρώπη. Τώρα είναι η ώρα που χρειαζόμαστε πατριωτική ηγεσία με καθαρή δημοκρατική εντολή.
Τώρα είναι η μεγάλη ευκαιρία για τον Αντώνη Σαμαρά.
Πώς το λέει και ο Αρχαίος; Δις ιζ Πάρτα!
Κακοφωνίξ

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